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CASENOTES AND COMMENTS
would not have been any necessity for such rationale of the
Court's action in thus judicially terminating the contract.
The conclusion is that there was sufficient evidence in the
case to go to the jury on the question of waiver, but that,
even if justification can be found for holding the contract
to be terminated, the Court should have been very reluctant
to adopt such a view and thus, because of the peculiar
Maryland rule refusing recovery on quantum meruit, de.
prive plaintiff of all compensation after he had rendered
valuable services.
APPRAISAL OF SHARES OF DISSENTING STOCK-
HOLDERS IN CONSOLIDATION -AMERICAN
GENERAL CORPORATION V. CAMP, ET AL. 1
Eight separate but allied corporations2 consolidated
into one corporation known as American General Corpora-
tion. The vote of the stockholders was not unanimous, but
the dissentients (preferred stockholders) were the owners
of much less than the amount required to prevent the con-
solidation. The dissenting stockholders demanded pay-
ment for their stock, but were unable to agree with the de-
fendant upon the fair value and filed a petition in the Cir-
cuit Court of Baltimore City for the appointment of three
disinterested commissioners to appraise the fair value of
their stock. The commissioners determined the fair value
of the stock to be its intrinsic value on a liquidation, and
made an award based thereon including interest from the
date of the consolidation. The dissenting stockholders
and the defendant corporation each excepted to the award
made by the Commissioners.
On appeal the award was modified. The award itself
was proper but interest should not have been allowed.' The
Commissioners properly found that the fair value of the
stock was its intrinsic value in a liquidation.sa The award
made by the Commissioners is presumed correct unless
clear evidence shows that the award was incorrectly made.
1190 AtI. 225 (Md. 1937).
Seven were Maryland corporations and one was a Delaware corpora-
tion.
" The decision of the court on this point has been changed by Acts, 1937,
Chapter 504, which provides that interest shall be allowable from the date
of the consolidation.
"a Throughout the opinion, however, the Court emphasized that value
upon a liquidation was not the only factor to be considered in an appraisal.
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Before the adoption of statutes authorizing the consoli-
dation,' or merger 5 of assets of a corporation upon the con-
sent of less than all of the stockholders, neither a solvent
corporation nor one in failing circumstances, could merge
or consolidate with any other corporation against the dis-
sent of a single stockholder.' With the advent of such stat-
utes and those giving to dissenting stockholders the right
to receive the fair value of their stock, the problem of stock
valuation and appraisal has arisen.7
The Maryland statute' provides that dissenting stock-
holders shall be entitled to receive the "fair value" of their
stock, and if there is disagreement as to that value then,
upon petition, the Court will appoint "three disinterested
commissioners" to appraise the fair value "without re-
gard to any depreciation or appreciation thereof in conse-
quence of the said consolidation or merger."'
The opinion of the Court of Appeals in the principal
case is careful to point out that the very nature of stock
valuation precludes formulation of specific rules of uniform
application and this statement is in accord with well-rea-
soned authorities.1" But the Court continues in the follow-
ing language: "So, when such a situation develops (term-
ination of stock ownership by merger or consolidation) it is
logical and consistent to infer that the fair value of such
stock to a dissenting owner is its intrinsic value on a liquida-
tion.''
And in the preceding paragraph the following language
was used: "Thus, by an ascertainment of all the assets
and liabilities of the corporation, the intrinsic value of the
stock, and not merely its market value, when traded in by
'Md. Code, Art. 23, Sees. 33-34.
Ibid.
Starret Corporation et al. v. Fifth Ave. & Twenty-ninth Street Corpora-
tion et al., 1 Fed. Supp. 868 (D. C. S. D. N. Y.) 1932; American Seating Co.
v. Bullard, 290 Fed. 896 (C. C. A. 6th 1923) ; Lattin, Remedies of Dissenting
Stockholders under Appraisal Statutes (1931) 45 Harv. L. Rev. 233, 234,
notes 1 and 2; Ferguson, Ex'r. v. Meredith et al., 1 Wall. 25, 68 U. S. 25, 17
L. Ed. 604 (1863) ; Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U. S. 590,
65 L. Ed. 425, 41 S. Ct. 209 (1921).
7For a general discussion of the problem see the following: Bonbright,
Valuation of Property (1937), Vol. II, Ch. 25; Lattin, op. cit. supra note 6;
Weiner, Payment of Dissenting Stockholders, (1927) 27 Col. L. Rev. 547;
Levy, Rights of Dissenting Shareholders to Appraisal & Payment, (1930)
15 Corn. L. Q. 420; Robinson, Dissenting Shareholders; Their Rights to
Dividends and the Valuation of Their Shares, (1932) 32 Col. L. Rev. 60.
:Md. Code Supp., Art. 23, Sec. 35.
'This section has been amended in regard to the interest provisions.
See supra note 3.
10 Lattin, op. cit. supra note 6, 270; Matter of Clark, 257 N. Y. 487, 178
N. E. 766, 79 A. L. R. 608 (1931).
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the public, would be determined. If the dissenting owner
receive this amount, so ascertained, he would receive the
fair value of his stock."
It would seem that the Court has in one paragraph defin-
itely refused to lay down any conclusive method of valua-
tion and in the surrounding paragraphs has proceeded to
hold that stock valuation in cases involving a merger or
consolidation must always be based upon asset value 'in
liquidation. If the Court is merely saying that in the par-
ticular circumstances of the principal case, asset value in
liquidation corresponded to the fair value of the stock, the
language employed would seem to be unfortunate since the
clear import of the paragraphs cited is that the Court relies
upon "intrinsic value on a liquidation" as the test of fair
value.
If, as is indicated by the opinion, fair value of stock is
to be determined by ascertaining the value of the stock as
if the company were being liquidated, a number of vital
criticisms appear. First, the company is not being liqui-
dated and consolidation is frequently effected to prevent
that very situation, thus a standard based on putative dis-
solution is paradoxical.1 Second, as a practical matter,
where the asset value is greater than the market value (and
it was very much greater in this case 2), such an attractive
alternative is held out as to place a premium upon dissent
and thus completely to thwart any efforts to consolidate.
This fact is doubly apparent when it is realized that the
dissenting stockholder is able materially to increase his
position by taking the asset value and buying in stock in
similar companies on the market. Third, as a matter of
logic, it would seem that consistency would demand that in
cases of investment trusts, asset value be used in determin-
ing the value to the company of stock held in its portfolio.
If this had been done in the instant case, it is possible that
the asset value of the stock would have been higher. The
objection to this contention is sufficiently forceful to war-
rant its discard.18 Fourth, appraisal on a strictly asset in
liquidation basis leaves out of account all the elements
11 Robinson, op. cit. supra note 7, p. 75.
'- As of November 22, 1935, the asset value of the International Securities
Corporation was $91.47. The market value of the stock, the day the terms
of the consolidation were made public (October 24, 1935), was 50 bid, 54
asked. The news of the consolidation caused a drop of almost $10 per
share. See Record pages 30-34, 71, 87-88.
"3 Such an appraisal would lead logically to the Herculean task of delving
into the value of each of the corporations whose shares are held by the
corporation whose own shares are being valued.
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which contribute to or detract from value as incidental to a
going enterprise, since it is obvious that were a liquidation
to take place, there could be no going concern value.
Although the Court of Appeals made no mention of the
fact, the briefs and records in the case reveal that the char-
ter of the corporation specifically provided that a consoli-
dation or merger should not be treated as a liquidation."
That this received no attention from the Court would
seem proper in view of the fact that to decide otherwise
would be in effect to say that the stockholders of a corpora-
tion might by charter provision prevent the dissenting
stockholders from receiving what the court has otherwise
determined constitutes fair value of stock. The decision,
however, does not seem to impair these charter provisions,
as the Court does not base its conclusion on the view that
the consolidation is a liquidation-dissolution giving rise to
the contract right of preferred stockholders to receive par
and accumulated dividends.
The Court of Appeals repudiated market value as con-
stituting fair value in the principal case for what are con-
sidered to be valid reasons. The evidence clearly showed
that the stock of the corporation was seldom traded and
that the market was so inactive as to afford no accurate
basis for fair value. It was intimated that had the stock
been active, market value would have been a definite but not
conclusive indication of the stock's fair value. 15  That mar-
ket value of stock should never be more than indicative of
fair value would seem apparent when it is realized that
there are infinite outside influences which affect the stock
exchange. The market is so super-sensitive that the price
of a particular stock at any particular time is bound to
be conditioned by the mood of the buying and selling public
at that instant. 6 In other words, it is obvious that human
1, Defendant's Exhibit No. 3, Record, page 25. Note particularly that the
provision had been placed in the charter by way of amendment a relatively
short time before the consolidation was announced.
15 Robinson, op. cit. supra note 7, p. 74, suggests that objections to the
market value standard "should perhaps be waived in the instances when
the sole assets of a corporation are shares of stock of other corporations.
Market prices as the standard would then be more desirable and expedient."
ja The Chancellor, in Chicago Corporation v. Munds, 172 Atl. 452, 455
(Del. Ch. 1934), used the following language: "The experience of recent
years is enough to convince the most casual observer that the market in its
appraisal of values must have been woefully wrong In its estimates at one
time or another within the interval of a space of time so brief that funda-
mental conditions could not possibly have become so altered as to affect
true worth. Markets are known to gyrate in a single day. The numerous
causes that contribute to their nervous leaps from dejected melancholy to
exhilarated enthusiasm and then back again from joy to grief, need not be
CASENOTES AND COMMENTS
psychology plays such an important role that the stock
market prices from day to day reflect factors utterly di-
vorced from the actual value of the stock." It is submitted
that stock market value is properly indicative only over a
relatively lengthy period; it is the average market value
alone which becomes significant. To the criticisms of mar-
ket value suggested by the Court, there should be added one
which the Court failed to mention but which would seem
the most compelling. "Overlooking entirely the question
whether the market prices are 'fair' in the sense that they
reflect the bids and offers of intelligent investors, the total
objection to market value is that it reflects the influence of
the very sale or merger against which the dissenter is seek-
ing a remedy. The market does not wait until the cor-
porate action has taken place before it discounts the event.
Often the transaction will be anticipated months, occasion-
ally years, in advance. Moreover, it is the frequent prac-
tice of bankers and promoters of mergers themselves to peg
the market for the stocks of the constitutent companies in
order to make the transaction seem equitable and advanta-
geous to all interests." 8 The above quotation is particu-
larly penetrating when considered in the light of the Mary-
land statute which expressly provides that the fair value of
the stock shall be ascertained entirely apart from any in-
creased or diminished value occasioned by the merger or
consolidation.19
One thing more might be said in regard to market value
as a standard. The purpose of the statute is to give a spe-
cific right to non-assenting shareholders. Yet if the antici-
pated merger or consolidation has resulted in a rise in the
price of the stock, then, if the stock has a ready market, the
dissenter will dispose of his shares without resorting to his
statutory remedy. "It is thus only when the market price
goes down that the dissenter is likely to seek payment from
reviewed. . . . The relation of supply to demand on a given day as truly
affects the market value of a stock as it does of a commodity; and tempo-
rary supply and demand are in turn affected by numerous circumstances
which are wholly disconnected from considerations having to do with the
stock's inherent worth."
'7 The Committee on Valuation of Secuities of the National Convention
of Insurance Commissioners adopted the following resolutions in 1931:
"Resolved, that the Committee .. . is of the opinion that under present
conditions the market quotations on stocks and bonds for a particular day
are not a fair standard for the ascertainment of fair market value of such
securities and recommends as a present substitute therefor the average
price of stocks and bonds as reflected by the exchanges for a range of five
quarterly periods ending September 30, 1931."
18 Bonbright, op. cit. supra note 7, p. 828.
19 Supra note 8.
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the corporation and then only if he feels that the intrinsic
value will prove sufficiently greater than what the shares
can bring on the market to warrant the trouble of starting
the necessary proceedings.2" It is submitted, therefore,
in the light of these factors that the statute loses most of its
efficacy if the fair value of the stock is to be the market
value.
An analysis of the cases reveals only one court which
has held market value alone to be the test and the result
in the cases from that jurisdiction depends upon the spe-
cific provision in the New Jersey statute that the dissenter
shall be entitled to the full market value of his stock.2
It is true that a majority of courts consider market value
as an important indication of value,22 but those courts cor-
rectly recognize that modifying factors2" may render that
indication of little value.'
Ultimately it should be borne in mind that the share-
holder in a corporation generally has purchased his stock
as an investment. He realizes that the stock may go down,
perhaps he visualizes a temporary suspension of dividends,
but he feels that over a period of time his purchase will
yield valuable returns. With this in mind it would seem
particularly important to minimize market value as an indi-
cation of true value. The stockholder was a part of a going
business which he felt would be financially successful and
through no fault of his own and over his protest he has sud-
denly found himself offered the market value of his stock
or stock in a new corporation having rights of lesser value
than his original purchase. 5
20 Levy, op. eit. supra note 7, p. 438.
21 Matter of Morris Canal & Banking Co., 104 N. J. L. 526, 141 A. 784
(1928) ; Prall v. United States Leather Co., 6 N. J. Misc. 967, 143 AtI. 382
(1928) af'd., 105 N. J. L. 646, 146 Atl. 916 (1929).
'2 Cole v. Wells, 224 Mass. 504, 113 N. E. 189 (1916) ; Republic Finance &
Investment Co. v. Fenstermaker, 6 N. E. (2d) 541 (Ind. 1937).
2" Particularly obvious factors are those such as existed in principal case,
1. e. where there is no readily ascertainable market value due to the scar-
city of transactions and where there is evidence that the public was hostile
to and had lost confidence in stocks of the nature in question.
2, The language of the Indiana court in the most recent case on this sub-
ject, Republic Finance & Investment Co. v. Fenstermaker, supra note 22,
was as follows: "Stock market value is not necessarily a true criterion,
since fluctuations are sometimes attributable to causes other than changes
in the value of the shares, but it may be of some assistance in determining
values."
:5 "The minority should not be forced to continue in an enterprise rad-
ically different from the venture on which they originally embarked, or in
an essentially altered status." Levy, op. cit. supra note 7, p. 421; in Chi-
cago Corporation v. Munds, supra note 16, the Chancellor pointed out that
while market value may be a proper measure in an action for the tortious
CASENOTES AND COMMENTS
The Commissioners found that "prices obtainable for
the shares of preferred stocks were so much below the net
asset values that neither good will nor going business value
could be assumed to exist." To attempt to analyze the
problem of the good will or the going concern value of an
investment trust is beyond the scope of this note, but it
would seem that a company whose sole assets consist of
securities would have a going concern value of some im-
portance since it is admitted that even a small degree of
appreciation of the company's portfolio would have put the
concern into a sound financial position. Statistics" reveal
that a rise of 11% in the asset value would have enabled the
company to pay par and accrued dividends. While it is
also true that a 28% decrease in asset value would have
wiped out all asset value applicable to preferred stock,
nevertheless at the time of valuation it was generally con-
ceded by economists and statisticians that we were experi-
encing a rising market. In view of the foregoing there
would seem to be merit in ascribing to the corporation some
value as a going concern. However, as previously pointed
out it should be noted that no going concern value could
be properly allowed if the court persists in treating the
problem from the standpoint of liquidation, for in the case
of a liquidation there is no going concern value.
While there are a number of cases on the subject of
valuation of dissenters' shares within the appraisal stat-
utes 27 there are only two precisely in point with the prin-
cipal case in dealing with preferred stock in a so-called in-
vestment trust.2  In the Chicago Corporation case29 the
court rejected the contention that merger in effect amounted
to dissolution pointing out that an appraisal of portfolio
value alone is deficient in not considering value as a going
conversion of stock by an outsider, such rule would not be a proper solu-
tion of . . . controversies between stockholders. He said: "But how can
the payment to the holder of stock of its market value put him in the way
of restoring his position as a continuing part owner of a going corporation,
when a merger has destroyed its individual identity and wiped out of
existence all the stock of the kind he owned. As there is none in existence,
none is available to be bought. The only restoration that can be made to
him is to substitute for the vanished stock its intrinsic worth 21
26 Record, pp. 44-51, 111, 116.
27 For a collection of these cases see 45 Harv. L. R. 233, 258; 15 Corn.
L. R. 420, 436; 32 Col. L. R. 60, 66. A Maryland case not arising under Md.
Code, Art. 23 Sec. 35 but interesting for its discussion of corporate values
is Homer, et al. vs. The Crown Cork & Seal Co. of Baltimore, 155 Md. 66,
141 Ati. 425 (1928).
38 Republic Finance & Investment Co. v. Fenstermaker, supra note 22;
Chicago Corporation v. Munds, supra note 16.
29 Supra note 25.
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concern. The opinion likewise rejected market value as an
exclusive test. In the Indiana case"0 the court rejected bo+h
market value and asset value in liquidation, the following
language being used: "The value of shares of stock as of
any given time must, of course, be determined from the
value of the assets of the corporation, tangible and intangi-
ble. This does not necessarily mean the amount that the as-
sets would bring upon liquidation, unless the corporation is
shown to have been in distress and liquidation inevitable.
Stock market value is not necessarily a true criterion, since
fluctuations are some times attributable to causes other than
changes in the value of the shares, but it may be of some
assistance in determining values." The position taken by
the court in the Indiana case was that every fact brought
forward which has a tendency to indicate value should be
taken into consideration, such as asset value, market value,
book value, good will or going concern value, earnings and
general economic conditions.
It was contended in the principal case that where any-
thing is given to common stockholders it constitutes a recog-
nition as a matter of law that the common stock is worth
something and that preferred stock should be paid in full in
order to preserve its contract priority."1 The only ap-
praisal case in which such a question seems to have been
passed upon by the courts is the Indiana case"2 just dis-
cussed. There the court held that "considerations of policy
or good will may account for allocation of stocks to common
stockholders in merging companies, notwithstanding an al-
location of stock on the strict basis of value might require
that it go to the preferred stockholders."
The fact that 95% of the common stock of Interna-
tional Securities Corporation and 80% of the common stock
of American Founders was held or controlled by a single
entity should also be considered in applying general prin-
ciples and tests of value in the appraisal cases. It should
be borne in mind that all increase in asset value in Amer-
ican Founders and all over 11% increase in asset value in
International Securities Corporation would inure exclu-
sively to the benefit of the common stock, except as it af-
forded a cushion for the preferred. Furthermore the large
amount of common stock outstanding substantially repre-
sented control of the corporation, despite the voting power
:0 Republic Finance & Investment Co. v. Fenstermaker, supra note 22.
81 See brief on behalf of stockholders, pp. 61-73.
82 Supra note 22.
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of the preferred through default in payment of dividends.
The control of the common stock would seem to have the
following significance:
1. "Something for the common stock." The control
of this stock, treating the corporation as a going concern,
had a very real value despite the fact that in the Interna-
tional Securities Corporation if a liquidation occurred there
would be nothing left for the common stock. The right to
control some $17,000,000 of assets with the potential benefit
that might so be derived would quite certainly bring a real
price on the market. It is a well-known fact that controlling
interest is often purchased although if immediate liquida-
tion occurred, nothing could be realized on the investment.
2. The right of the common stock to control carried
with it a correlative element of risk so far as the preferred
was concerned. Even assuming honest but unsatisfactory
management by the common, whether through error injudgment or inability to foresee unpredictable trends of
the market, there was a very real risk that the preferred
might, without the ability to prevent it, find its asset posi-
tion impaired. As has so often been said, it is, however,
the right of the common stock acting in good faith to con-
trol the destiny of a corporation, even though the course
followed may appear to be financial suicide, s a
3. Because the corporation was a going concern and
the statute required that valuation be made as if the con-
solidation were not conceived, the standard of valuation of
the interest of preferred stockholders should not have been
liquidation value as such. Even if the assets had consisted
entirely of cash, it would seem to be clear that the interest
represented by a minority preferred stockholder in such
case where the right to continue the business rested with
someone else, with the inherent risk of loss which this en-
tailed, would be something less than the present aliquot
share of that cash.
In the final analysis, it is submitted that the part the
courts should play in stock valuation cases is a negative
one. Instructions to the appraisers should point out that
no indication of value by itself can be the sole basis of a
determination of fair value. If the Court of Appeals has
laid down for the future the rule that asset value in liquida-
tion is controlling, it seems to run contra to the better rea-
soned text writers and authorities. It should be remem-
bered that the problem involved is above all an economic
8 a See Powers Foundry Co. v. Miller, 166 Md. 590, 171 At. 842 (1934).
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one and that if definite standards are necessary "they can
better be derived by consulting the business man, the
banker, and the industrial engineer, than the jurist, legal
scholar, or lawyer.""
Perhaps the most encouraging thing about the opinion
of the Maryland Court is the following paragraph: "In
reaching a decision, the appraisal of the Commissioners
must be given great weight, first, by the Chancellor and
now by this tribunal. The presumption is that their award
is correct, and effect will be given to their determination
unless it appear by clear and satisfactory evidence that
the award was, by reason of some material and prejudicial
error of law, in conduct or of fact, not the fair value of the
stock, without regard to any depreciation or appreciation
thereof in consequence of the merger or consolidation.""
It should be pointed out that the decision affirming the
award can be justified on the record without accepting the
principle that "asset value in liquidation" represents the
minimum proper award in such cases. The commissioners
may well have felt that the market in the stock had been too
"thin" to establish any reliable market value.3 5 Whether
selling values of so-called "comparable stocks," strongly
urged by the defendant corporation but not mentioned by
the lower or appellate court, should have been employed as
an active factor in determining value would seem to be a
matter within the commissioners' discretion. They may
well have felt that the comparisons with the other compa-
nies selected were not sufficiently close to require that
weight be given to such evidence in reaching their deter-
mination.
Viewed in its long-range aspects, the decision will be
unfortunate only if commissioners appointed in future
cases regard the opin'ou as laying down an instruction that
"asset value in liquidation" is a conclusive minimum. If
88 Lattin, op. cit. supra note 6, p. 270.
84 See the following Maryland cases dealing with the weight to be given
the decisions on facts of lay tribunals: Bonaparte v. Mayor and City
Council of Baltimore, et al., 131 Md. 80, 86, 101 Atl. 594 (1917) ; Schemmel
v. Gatch & Sons Contracting & Bldg. Co., 164 Md. 671, 166 Atl. 39 (1933) ;
West, et al., v. United Railways & Elec. Co. of Baltimore, 155 Md. 572, 582,
142 At. 870 (1928).
88 Record, pp. 51-52. Testimony at this point indicated that only five or
six quotations were made over a six months period. The last published
statement of assets prior to notice of the consolidation, showed an asset
value of only $46.17 per share of preferred, while the so-called market value
Immediately prior to the notice was $52 per share. Stockholders, therefore,
made the argument that market value in this case was merely a reflection
of the public's impression of the assets back of the stock, and for that
reason not entitled to much weight in fixing the intrinsic or fair value.
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an active market value is shown, the average prices at which
sales are consummated, whether above or below asset value,
cannot properly be ignored.
A rule definitely fixing either asset value or market
value as the test to determine fair value clearly fails to
recognize that value when applied to stocks is a combina-
tion of many elements none of which can be ignored. The
ultimate result must be an analysis of all existing elements
not as entities but as relationships. The closer a court ap-
proaches establishing a specific test the farther it will have
strayed from establishing the correct general test.
ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE FOR DURESS WHERE
PRE-MARITAL RELATIONS HAVE OCCURRED-
LURZ V. LURZ1
Plaintiff-appellee-husband, through his father and next
friend, filed a bill of complaint in equity against defendant-
appellant-wife, seeking an annulment of their marriage.
The bill alleged that, at a time when plaintiff was fifteen
years of age and defendant twenty, the latter "by solicita-
tion and womanly arts" induced plaintiff frequently to co-
habit with her with the result that, after about two years,
she became pregnant; that after discovering this the de-
fendant "threatened and coerced by deceit and fraud" the
plaintiff into marrying her, the threats including a threat
to have him arrested if he failed to support the child; that
the plaintiff and defendant went to Ellicott City where the
defendant caused the plaintiff to "wait outside of a building
in said city as he looked too young to have a marriage
license issued" while she went into said building and pro-
cured the license by perjured testimony as to plaintiff's
age; that before a minister in said city the parties went
through a "form of ceremony which the complainant now
understands and believes to have been the usual marriage
ceremony." The child was born seven or eight months
later and the plaintiff's parents first learned of the mar-
riage about a month and a half after the birth. The bill
was filed six days after that and sought both an annulment
and that the infant child be maintained by plaintiff in a
home to be selected by the Court. From an order over-
ruling her demurrer to the bill and directing her to answer,
defendant appeals. Held, Affirmed and cause remanded
1170 Md. 428, 184 AtI. 906, 185 AtI. 676 (dissenting opinion) (1936).
